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SUMMARY
Gender equality is one of the key challenges confronted 
by pension systems around the world. In a context of 
gendered labour markets, contributory pension systems 
face several constraints to guarantee universal and 
adequate pension benefits for women. Women’s life 
courses are characterized by longer periods dedicated 
to taking care of others, lower labour market partici-
pation, more part-time work and lower earnings. All 
these features compromise their pension entitlements 
in pension systems that link benefits to paid work, 
contributions and earnings. This paper deals with the 
challenges and constraints that pension systems face 
to be gender equitable and the policy alternatives to 
address these challenges. The economic protection 
of women in later life depends on several factors that 
intersect, including pension system rules, labour market 
conditions and family arrangements over the past and 
present. This paper focuses on pension system rules and 
how they interact with other social and labour market 
conditions over women’s life courses to reproduce or 
mitigate gender inequalities in old age. 
The paper first identifies the main aspects of women’s 
life courses as well as the key pension design features 
that matter for women’s pension entitlements. It 
reviews the structure, objectives and instruments of 
pension systems (including contributory social insur-
ance, defined contribution individual accounts and 
multi-pillar systems) and identifies the key sources of 
gender inequality in pension entitlements in a context 
of gendered labour markets. It also briefly addresses 
the main pension reform directions after the global 
crisis and their likely impact on women’s benefits. 
A separate section is dedicated to non-contributory 
pensions: their development around the world, and 
the potential they have to address existing gaps in ac-
cess to old age protection across gender and income 
groups. And a final section discusses some of the most 
relevant components built into contributory pension 
systems to protect women in the family, including pen-
sion rights for widows and divorcees and contribution 
credits for caregivers.
The study shows that pension design matters for 
gender equality. Policies to enhance the protection of 
women in old age involve making choices concerning 
crucial aspects of pension design, which are also choic-
es regarding the distribution of rights and resources in 
each country. Since women have more limited contrib-
utory histories and higher life expectancies than men, 
policies that strengthen contributory requirements or 
emphasise individual savings can make it harder for 
women to get adequate benefits. In contrast, policies 
that establish adequate minimum protection floors, 
extend pension rights to previously uncovered groups 
and make access to benefits for non-standard or in-
formal workers more flexible can all contribute in one 
way or another to enhancing women’s rights to old 
age pensions. 
Overall, the paper shows that crucial policy choices 
for the protection of women concern the conditions 
for entitlements in pension systems (based on either 
work, need or citizenship), the types of transfers that 
are promoted between women and men, the policy 
tools available to offset gender differences in paid 
work, earnings and unpaid work (such as contribution 
credits) and the protection of the most vulnerable so-
cial groups through redistributive benefits. The paper 
ends with some recommendations to make pension 
systems more gender equitable and suggests that 
policies aimed at achieving gender equality in pension 
rights and benefits need to work on several comple-
mentary fronts (including measures regarding pension 
system design, but also labour market regulation and 
the reconciliation of work and family life) and consider 
the diversity of women’s situation across social strata 
as well as across countries.
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RÉSUMÉ
L’égalité des sexes est l’un des principaux défis aux-
quels sont confrontés les systèmes de retraite du 
monde entier. Dans un contexte de marchés du travail 
auxquels participent femmes et hommes, les régimes 
de retraite par répartition font face à plusieurs con-
traintes pour garantir le caractère universel et adéquat 
des prestations de retraite pour les femmes. Par rap-
port aux hommes, la vie d’une femme est marquée 
par des périodes plus longues consacrées à s’occuper 
d’autrui, une participation plus faible au marché du 
travail, du travail majoritairement à temps partiel et 
des revenus plus faibles. Toutes ces caractéristiques 
compromettent leur droit à une retraite au sein des 
régimes de référence qui accordent des prestations 
de retraite directement en fonction du travail payé ef-
fectué, des cotisations et des revenus. Ce document-ci 
aborde les défis et les contraintes auxquels font face 
les systèmes de retraite pour faire preuve d’équité entre 
les sexes, et les politiques alternatives pour résoudre 
ces défis. La protection économique des femmes en 
âge avancé, dépend aujourd’hui de plusieurs facteurs 
liés, y compris des règles des systèmes de retraite, des 
conditions du marché du travail et des dispositions fa-
miliales prises à divers moments. Cet article se penche 
sur les règles des systèmes de retraite et leur interac-
tion avec d’autres conditions sociales et du marché du 
travail au cours de la vie d’une femme, pour reproduire 
ou atténuer les inégalités entre les sexes au moment 
de la vieillesse.   
Le document identifie tout d’abord les principaux 
aspects de la vie d’une femme ainsi que les caractéri-
stiques clés de la conception des retraites qui revêtent 
une importance pour le droit à la retraite des femmes. 
Il examine la structure, les objectifs et les instruments 
des systèmes de retraite (y compris l’assurance sociale 
contributive et les comptes individuels à cotisations 
déterminées ainsi que les systèmes « multipliers »), et 
il identifie les principales causes d’inégalité entre les 
sexes en matière de droits à la retraite dans un con-
texte de marché du travail auquel participent femmes 
et hommes. Il aborde également et brièvement les ori-
entations principales de la réforme des pensions après 
la crise économique mondiale, et l’impact probable 
qu’elles auront sur les prestations dont bénéficient 
les femmes. Une rubrique séparée est consacrée aux 
systèmes de retraite sans cotisation, à leur évolution 
dans le monde et au potentiel qu’ils ont de résoudre 
les lacunes existantes en matière d’accès à la protec-
tion au moment de la vieillesse, indépendamment du 
sexe et du niveau de revenu. La dernière rubrique du 
document aborde les éléments les plus pertinents qui 
sont intégrés aux régimes de retraite par répartition 
pour protéger les femmes dans la famille, y compris les 
droits à la retraite des veuves et des femmes divorcées, 
et les crédits de cotisation pour les soignants. 
L’étude montre que la conception de la retraite a une 
importance sur l’égalité des sexes. Les politiques visant 
à améliorer la protection des femmes au moment 
de la vieillesse impliquent des choix portant sur cer-
tains aspects cruciaux de la conception de la retraite 
qui ont également trait à la répartition des droits et 
des ressources dans chaque pays. Étant donné que 
les femmes cotisent pendant moins longtemps et 
que leur espérance de vie est supérieure à celle des 
hommes, les politiques qui renforcent les exigences 
en matière de cotisations ou mettent l’accent sur 
l’épargne individuelle peuvent rendre l’obtention de pr-
estations adéquates plus difficile pour les femmes. En 
revanche, les politiques qui établissent des niveaux de 
protection adéquats minimaux, élargissent les droits 
à la retraite à des groupes qui n’étaient pas couverts 
précédemment et rendent l’accès aux prestations plus 
flexible pour les travailleurs officieux et non-standard, 
peuvent tous contribuer d’une manière ou d’une autre 
à l’amélioration des droits des femmes à la retraite. 
Dans l’ensemble, le document montre que les choix 
politiques indispensables à la protection des femmes 
portent sur les conditions donnant droit de bénéficier 
des systèmes de retraite (qu’elles soient fonction du 
travail, du besoin ou de la citoyenneté), les types de 
transferts promus entre femmes et hommes, les in-
struments de politique disponibles pour compenser les 
différences entre les sexes à l’égard du travail rémunéré, 
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aux revenus et au travail non rémunéré (par exemple 
les crédits de cotisation), et la protection des groupes 
socioéconomiques les plus vulnérables par le biais 
de prestations redistributives. Le document formule 
en conclusion, des recommandations pour rendre 
les systèmes de retraite plus équitables du point de 
vue sexospécifique, suggère que les politiques visant 
à atteindre une égalité entre les sexes, pour ce qui 
 
 
 
 
est des droits et des prestations de retraite, œuvrent 
sur plusieurs fronts complémentaires (y compris des 
mesures concernant la conception du système de 
retraite, mais aussi la réglementation du marché du 
travail et une conciliation entre vie privée et vie pro-
fessionnelle), et examinent la diversité de la situation 
des femmes dans toutes les classes sociales et tous 
les pays. 
RESUMEN
La igualdad de género es uno de los desafíos más 
importantes a los que se enfrentan los sistemas de 
pensiones de todo el mundo. En el actual contexto de 
segregación de los mercados laborales por género, los 
sistemas de pensiones contributivas están sometidos 
a varias restricciones que impiden garantizar unas 
prestaciones de jubilación universales y adecuadas 
para las mujeres. Los ciclos de vida de las mujeres se 
caracterizan por períodos más largos dedicados al 
cuidado de otras personas, una participación menor 
en el mercado laboral, más trabajo a tiempo parcial 
e ingresos más bajos. Todas estas circunstancias 
comprometen su derecho a recibir una pensión en 
los sistemas de pensiones que vinculan las prestacio-
nes con el trabajo remunerado, las contribuciones y 
los ingresos. En el presente informe se examinan los 
desafíos y las restricciones a los que se enfrentan los 
sistemas de pensiones para alcanzar la equidad de 
género y las alternativas de políticas que ayudarían 
a superar estos retos. La protección económica de la 
mujer en las etapas avanzadas de la vida depende 
actualmente de diversos factores interrelacionados, 
como las normas del sistema de pensiones, las condi-
ciones del mercado laboral y los acuerdos familiares 
del pasado y el presente, entre otros. Este informe se 
centra en las normas del sistema de pensiones y en 
su interacción con otras condiciones sociales y del 
mercado laboral a lo largo de la vida de las mujeres, 
con vistas a reproducir o mitigar las desigualdades de 
género en la vejez. 
El informe comienza identificando los aspectos más 
importantes de los ciclos de vida de las mujeres, así 
como las características claves del diseño de las ju-
bilaciones que resultan pertinentes para el derecho 
de las mujeres a recibir una pensión. Posteriormente 
se revisan la estructura, los objetivos y los instrumen-
tos de los sistemas de pensiones, incluido el seguro 
social contributivo y la cuenta individual de contri-
bución definida, además de los sistemas mixtos, y se 
identifican las principales fuentes de desigualdad de 
género en los derechos de pensión en un contexto 
de segregación de los mercados laborales según el 
género. También se analizan brevemente las trayec-
torias que han seguido las reformas más importantes 
de los sistemas de pensiones tras la crisis mundial y 
su efecto probable en las prestaciones de las mujeres. 
Se ha dedicado una sección específica a las pensiones 
no contributivas, su evolución en todo el mundo y su 
potencial para solucionar las deficiencias existentes 
en el acceso a la protección de las personas de edad 
avanzada de los diferentes grupos de ingresos y 
género. Por último, se analizan algunos de los com-
ponentes más relevantes incorporados a los sistemas 
de pensiones contributivas a fin de proteger a las mu-
jeres en el seno de la familia, incluido el derecho de 
las mujeres viudas y divorciadas a recibir una pensión 
y los créditos de cotización para las y los cuidadores.
El estudio demuestra que el diseño de las pensiones 
influye en la igualdad de género. La aplicación de 
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políticas destinadas a mejorar la protección de las 
mujeres de edad avanzada implica tomar decisiones 
sobre aspectos cruciales del diseño de las pensiones, 
decisiones que afectan también a la distribución de 
los derechos y los recursos en cada país. Dado que las 
mujeres cuentan con historiales contributivos más 
limitados y que su esperanza de vida supera a la de 
los hombres, las políticas que refuerzan los requisitos 
contributivos o hacen hincapié en el ahorro indi-
vidual pueden dificultar la obtención de prestaciones 
adecuadas por parte de las mujeres. Por el contrario, 
las políticas que establecen niveles mínimos de pro-
tección adecuados, amplían los derechos de pensión 
a grupos no cubiertos anteriormente y flexibilizan el 
acceso de los trabajadores informales o no estándar 
a las prestaciones pueden contribuir de una manera 
u otra a mejorar los derechos de las mujeres de edad 
avanzada a recibir una pensión. 
En términos generales, el informe demuestra que las 
elecciones de políticas cruciales para la protección de 
las mujeres están relacionadas con las condiciones 
para tener derecho a una prestación en los sistemas 
de pensiones (independientemente de que la base 
sea el trabajo, la necesidad o la ciudadanía), los tipos 
de transferencias que se fomentan entre hombres y 
mujeres, las políticas disponibles para compensar las 
diferencias de género en el trabajo remunerado, los in-
gresos y el trabajo no remunerado (como los créditos 
de cotización), y la protección de los grupos sociales 
más vulnerables mediante prestaciones redistributi-
vas. El informe finaliza con algunas recomendaciones 
para aumentar la equidad de género de los sistemas 
de pensiones y sugiere que las políticas destinadas a 
alcanzar la igualdad de género en derechos de pen-
sión y prestaciones deben ocuparse de varios frentes 
complementarios (que incluyen las medidas relativas 
al diseño del sistema de pensiones, así como la regu-
lación del mercado laboral y la conciliación de la vida 
familiar y laboral) y tener en cuenta la diversidad de 
situaciones de las mujeres en los diferentes estratos 
sociales y en los distintos países.
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1. 
INTRODUCTION
1
Pension systems have been an essential policy tool for the economic protection of older adults across 
countries and regions for a long time. However, in a context of widespread inequality, not everyone 
enjoys the same level of protection. Currently, around half of older adults in the world receive no 
pension benefit (ILO 2014: 73). In many low- and middle-income countries, pension coverage remains 
limited and unequally distributed and most people continue to rely on income from work and/
or family help during later life. Substantial inequalities in pension coverage and benefits are found 
around the world based on region of residence, ethnic group, occupational sector and gender.
Since  women’s lifecourses are different from men’s, 
pension systems also often have different outcomes 
for women and men. Gender inequalities in the labour 
market and the unequal distribution of paid and unpaid 
work in the family mean that women tend to have lower 
pension coverage, lower benefits and greater vulnerabil-
ity in old age. These gender gaps overlap with existing 
inequalities in pension coverage and benefits for work-
ers across occupational and income strata. In addition, 
women’s labour market patterns have also changed 
substantially over the past half century and so have the 
family arrangements on which many pension systems 
have traditionally relied. Recent pension reforms around 
the world have addressed some of these issues, leading 
to progress in some countries, but gender inequalities in 
old age protection remain. 
This paper deals with the challenges and constraints that 
pension systems face to be gender equitable and the 
policy alternatives to address these challenges. Cross-
country differences in the design and scope of pension 
systems are built over time and involve political choices, 
priorities and compromises that shape the structure 
of pension systems and the degree of redistribution 
that is promoted. Policy decisions over the years have 
also shaped the gender impacts of pension systems in 
specific socio-economic and labour market contexts. 
The economic protection of women in later life today de-
pends on several factors that intersect, including pension 
rules, labour market conditions and family arrangements 
1 I would like to thank Shahra Razavi, Laura Turquet, Ginette 
Azcona, Juliana Martinez Franzoni and two anonymous refer-
ees for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of 
this paper. They have contributed to improve the content and 
arguments of the paper, but are of course not responsible for 
the shortcomings that may remain.
over the past and present. This paper focuses on pension 
system rules and how they interact with other social 
and labour market conditions over women’s lifecourses. 
In particular, the paper evaluates the way in which spe-
cific pension design features can reproduce or mitigate 
gender inequalities in old age. Identifying the sources of 
gender gaps in pension systems can contribute to un-
derstanding the impacts that recently adopted pension 
reforms can have and the policy directions that can help 
enhance gender equality today and in the future. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section iden-
tifies the main aspects of women’s lifecourses as well as 
the key pension design features that matter for women’s 
pension entitlements. Subsequently, section three reviews 
the objectives and instruments of alternative pension 
systems and the gender gaps that are currently found 
both in pension coverage and in the incidence of poverty 
in old age. Building on that, section four identifies the key 
sources of gender inequality in pension entitlements in 
a context of gendered labour markets and section five 
deals with gender gaps in defined contribution pension 
systems. Section six then briefly addresses the main 
reform directions after the global crisis and their likely im-
pact on women’s pensions. Section seven is dedicated to 
non-contributory pensions, reviewing the development 
of these benefits around the world and the potential they 
have to address existing gaps in access to old age protec-
tion. Section eight discusses some of the most relevant 
components built into contributory pension systems to 
protect women in the family, including pension rights 
for widows, divorcees and caregivers. Finally, section nine 
summarizes the main findings and concludes.
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2. 
WOMEN’S LIFECOURSES 
AND PENSION 
ENTITLEMENTS
There are a number of aspects of women’s lifecourses that affect their pension entitlements. 
The first relates to labour market participation. Despite an upward trend, women still have lower 
labour market participation rates than men. Recent data indicate that in the world on average 
about 51 per cent of women, compared to 77 per cent of men, are in the labour force (Table 2-1). 
Average participation rates are higher in some world regions than others, but a gender gap is 
found in all of them. Women also work part time more often than men. In Europe and Central 
Asia on average nearly 23 per cent of total female employment is part-time, compared to only 7 
per cent of male employment, and similarly large gaps are found in the other world regions for 
which data are available. These labour market patterns are linked to gender roles and cultural 
norms by which women tend to assume most of the care work in the family. Around the world, 
as spouses, daughters, sisters and/or mothers, women provide most of the care for children, 
the sick and disabled or elderly relatives (United Nations 2010). This compromises their labour 
market earnings and employment-related benefits, including future pensions.
Data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are illustrative of 
the way in which work trajectories differ between 
women and men (Table 2-2). While in the European 
countries surveyed, men aged 65 and over have an 
average record of 35 to 43 years of employment, 
women only have on average between 12.8 years 
of employment in Spain and 35.3 in the Czech 
Republic (or between 19.4 in the Netherlands and 
35.6 in the Czech Republic if only women with 
some employment are considered). The gender 
gap varies across countries: women have par-
ticularly short employment histories in Southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain) as well as 
in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. In Greece, 
Italy and Spain there is also a non-negligible 
number of women who have never entered the 
labour market. 
The second aspect of women’s life course that in-
fluences pension entitlements is the gender gap in 
earnings. Women have lower average earnings than 
men, because they both work part time more often 
and on average obtain lower hourly pay(for various 
reasons, including more work in lower-paid occupa-
tions such as domestic service and more constraints 
to reach managerial positions). Recent estimates 
(for year 2011) point to an average earnings gap for 
full-time women and men of 14.8 per cent in OECD 
countries.2 In pension systems that link benefits to 
past earnings or contributions, this results in lower 
benefits for women. 
2 The gender wage gap is unadjusted and defined as the dif-
ference between male and female median wages divided 
by the male median wages (full time employees). See OECD.
StatExtracts. nd..“Gender wage gap.”http://stats.oecd.org/ 
(accessed 10 July 2014).
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Third, women tend to live longer than men. On 
average, women’s life expectancies worldwide are 
estimated at 4.2 years above men’s, and the gap is 
even higher in some world regions (Table 2-1). As a 
result, women require greater lifetime transfers to 
finance a longer period of retirement. When these 
longer periods of pension receipt are taken into 
consideration in the calculation of pension benefits 
(as happens with individual accounts that use sex-
differentiated life expectancies), women get lower 
monthly pension benefits than men, independent of 
their labour market and contribution patterns. 
Fourth, given longer life expectancy (and the fact 
that women often marry men a few years older) 
women are more likely to become widows. Thus 
women who lack a retirement pension of their own 
can be particularly vulnerable in old age if they are 
not entitled to a widow’s pension (for instance, if 
their deceased husband worked in an informal sector 
job with no pension rights) and no other adequate 
benefits (such as non-contributory pensions) exist 
for them. Widowhood can bring economic hardship 
and vulnerability for women.
There are three main features of pension schemes 
that matter for their gender outcomes.3 The first is 
the conditions of entitlements, including the eligi-
bility requirements to obtain a benefit (for instance, 
whether benefits are universal, means-tested, 
pension-tested or based on past contributions). 
The conditions for entitlements also relate to more 
specific pension rules – for instance, how many 
years of contributions are required (the so-called 
‘vesting period’), the income or asset threshold for 
means-tested benefits, and whether benefits are 
right-based or depend on resources available and 
waiting lists. The conditions of entitlement define 
who can get a benefit and how coverage is ulti-
mately distributed.
The second feature is the link between ben-
efits, on the one hand, and contributions and past 
earnings on the other. This relates to whether 
pension schemes are defined benefit or defined 
3  See, among others, Ginn 2003b; Ståhlberg et al. 2005;Gilbert 
2006; Frericks and Maier 2008; Marin and Zólyomi 2010; Arza 
2012a.
TABLE 2-1
Labour market participation, part-time employment and life expectancy for women and men, 2012
Labour force participation 
rate(% of female/male 
population ages 15+)
Part-time employment
(% of total female/male 
employment)
Life expectancy at 
birth (years)
 Women Men   Difference 
(W-M)
 Women  Men   Difference 
(W-M)
 Women  Men   Difference 
(W-M)
East Asia and Pacific 61.2 78.4 -17.2 … … … 76.7 72.8 3.8
Europe and Central Asia 50.7 67.2 -16.5 23.1 7.2 15.9 80.3 73.3 7.0
Latin America and 
Caribbean
53.5 79.6 -26.1 27.5 11.4 16.1 77.8 71.6 6.2
Middle East and North 
Africa
21.3 74.3 -52.9 … … … 74.2 70.3 4.0
North America 57.3 69.5 -12.2 17.0 7.6 9.4 81.4 76.7 4.7
South Asia 31.8 81.4 -49.6 … … … 68.3 65.1 3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 63.5 76.5 -12.9 … … … 57.6 55.3 2.3
World 50.5 76.8 -26.3 … … … 72.9 68.7 4.2
Notes:… no data. Data for part-time employment for Latin America corresponds to year 2009.
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank 2014.
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contribution, a key distinction in the pension lit-
erature. It also relates to whether benefits are flat 
rate, earnings-related or actuarial, or a combination 
of those models. Third, the link between benefits, 
contributions and earnings is also associated with 
whether benefits keep track with earnings/prices in 
the retirement period (i.e., the rules for indexation) 
and whether life expectancies are taken into consid-
eration for the calculation of benefits. All of these 
features define the distribution of benefits among 
individuals based on their individual lifecourses (in-
cluding labour market participation, earnings and 
life expectancy).
In addition, it is also important whether there are 
specific provisions for widows and divorcees as well 
as to compensate for unpaid care work. This is re-
lated to several specific aspects of pension system 
rules, including the nature of derived benefits, the 
rules regarding joint annuities and the existence 
and characteristics of contribution credits for care-
related reasons. Compared to direct benefit, which 
protects people as paid workers (in contributory 
systems), these components of pension systems are 
oriented to protect individuals as family members 
and unpaid workers providing care. They have vari-
ous underlying logics (for instance, some are based 
on the idea of economic dependence, others more 
clearly reward family members for their unpaid care 
work, while others are mainly concerned with basic 
poverty protection), but they are similar in that they 
all address the impact that the distribution of family 
roles, including paid and unpaid work in the family, 
can have on women’s future pension entitlements. 
Besides these important features of labour markets 
and pension system rules, there are two other relevant 
aspects to take into consideration to understand the 
gender distribution of old age protection. The first 
relates to the changes that have been taking place 
over the past decades in both women’s lifecourses 
as well as pension system rules. Broadly speaking, 
women in younger cohorts now tend to have higher 
labour market participation rates, bear fewer chil-
dren, spend fewer years out of the labour force and 
have higher educational attainment. This suggests 
TABLE 2-2
Average years in employment for women and men over 65 in Europe
Years in employment (entire sample, 
including zero employment)
Years in employment
(for those with some employment)
Men Women Gap (M-W) Men Women Gap (M-W)
Germany 39.6 24.4 15.2 39.8 26.7 13.1
Netherlands 39.8 16.4 23.4 40.5 19.4 21.1
France 35.1 21.1 14.0 37.2 25.6 11.6
Greece 38.6 14.6 24.0 41.5 31.7 9.7
Austria 39.7 19.4 20.3 40.6 23.9 16.7
Spain 43.4 12.8 30.5 44.7 22.6 22.2
Sweden 43.1 31.9 11.2 43.6 33.5 10.1
Italy 38.6 14.6 24.0 39.6 24.5 15.0
Belgium 39.2 17.3 22.0 39.7 22.1 17.6
Poland 35.9 24.9 11.0 37.9 30.7 7.2
Denmark 40.9 29.7 11.2 41.2 30.9 10.3
Czech Republic 40.1 35.3 4.9 40.3 35.6 4.7
Switzerland 42.4 21.8 20.5 42.5 23.4 19.1
Source: European Commission 2013: Table 9.2.
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a cohort effect may put younger generations of 
women in a better position to get contributory pen-
sions on retirement than were older generations of 
women. However, at the same time, the labour mar-
ket has become more flexible, and in some countries 
(especially those hardest hit by the international 
financial crisis) pension system retrenchment in a 
context of austerity has made eligibility conditions 
more restrictive and has cut down pension replace-
ment rates. These reforms may make it increasingly 
difficult for women, and indeed all workers who lack 
a long and continuous participation in the formal 
labour market, to get an adequate pension benefit 
in the future (see section 6). So various changes are 
pushing in different directions and their joint impact 
remains to be seen.
The second important aspect relates to the het-
erogeneity of women’s life conditions across both 
countries and social strata. While women share 
some life-course patterns, which as presented above 
can have an impact on their pension entitlements, 
averages hide large differences among women 
themselves across countries and social groups. For 
instance, professional women in high-income coun-
tries tend to have working and earning lives that are 
very different from the working lives of low-income 
women in middle- and low-income countries. So the 
impact on women of specific pension design features 
is also likely to vary substantially, and not all of them 
will benefit or suffer from the same pension rules. 
In other words, while women’s weak position vis-
à-vis the pension system is mainly associated with 
gendered labour markets and the unequal distribu-
tion of paid work, earnings and care, these patterns 
are also themselves unequally distributed among 
women across countries and social strata.
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3. 
THE DESIGN AND 
COVERAGE OF PENSION 
SYSTEMS AND POVERTY 
IN OLD AGE
3.1 
The structure and objectives of multi-pillar pension systems
There are several types of pension schemes currently in place in various countries around the 
world and quite often more than one of them operates in a country as building blocks of a 
more or less integrated multi-pillar system. Specific pension schemes can be compared based 
on their main objectives, their eligibility conditions (i.e., conditions of entitlement) and the types 
of benefits they offer (i.e., the link between contributions and benefits). These features have 
implications for the distributional impacts that pension systems can have in various contexts. 
Table 3-1 compares alternative pension schemes on 
those aspects. While pension schemes implemented 
in practice may divert from these ‘ideal typical’ models 
(and other types may also exist) the classification is 
useful to compare policy alternatives. Pension systems 
typically have two main objectives: (1) poverty preven-
tion and redistribution and (2) consumption smoothing 
(Barr and Diamond 2009). Not all pension benefits are 
intended to achieve – or capable of achieving – both. 
The main objectives of universal and means-tested 
non-contributory pensions are poverty prevention 
and redistribution. Both provide a basic benefit to 
older adults independent of past work, earnings and 
contributions, but while universal non-contributory 
pensions include the entire population of older adults, 
means-tested benefits target lower-income people 
(see section 7). There is also another policy option in 
between, namely pension-tested systems, which offer 
benefits to older adults who have no other pension but 
without a test of means, income or assets. Two other 
types of pension benefits oriented to poverty preven-
tion and redistribution, but under contributory rather 
than non-contributory arrangements, are minimum 
pensions (that top up existing pension entitlements) 
and contributory flat-rate pensions (that offer eligible 
contributors the same benefit level for all). 
Pension benefits oriented to consumption smooth-
ing can also be organized in several ways. The most 
common type is social insurance pensions. These are 
contributory pension schemes, administered by the 
state, which provide earnings-related benefits for 
formal sector workers (contributors). These systems 
may involve some type of intra-generational redistri-
bution (for instance, when they include progressive 
replacement rates or minimum benefits) but their 
main purpose is consumption smoothing (section 
4). Defined contribution systems are also aimed at 
consumption smoothing, but with stronger links be-
tween contributions and benefits. This is particularly 
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the case of individual savings schemes, a pension 
model that has spread widely across countries in the 
past decades (especially in Latin America and Central 
and Eastern Europe) and is typically administered 
by private companies (section 5). These systems by 
definition exclude redistributive elements (which 
can instead be incorporated in other ‘pillars’ in multi-
pillar systems) and make entitlements closely reflect 
work, earnings and retirement patterns.
Multi-pillar pension system structures have been in-
creasingly adopted in a wide range of countries over 
the past decades. In these systems two or more pension 
benefits coexist, performing different goals in a more or 
less integrated structure. The literature usually identifies 
four pillars: (a) a ‘zero pillar’ of basic non-contributory 
public benefits; (b) a ‘first pillar’ of mandatory public 
pensions; (c) a ‘second pillar’ of mandatory private pen-
sions; and (d) a ‘third pillar’ of voluntary pension savings. 
Pension systems in each country can then combine 
these pillars in various ways to achieve different policy 
goals. While the importance given to each pillar varies 
across countries and not all countries have all four pillars, 
most now have more than one. The particular combina-
tion of pension pillars (including benefit types as well as 
more specific pension design features such as eligibility 
conditions, population effectively covered, benefit levels, 
and so on) shape the impacts the pension systems can 
have in each country on different groups of people and 
on women and men.
TABLE 3-1
Typical features of alternative old age pension schemes
Conditions for 
entitlement Administration Benefit type Main objective
Contribution-
based?
Means-
tested?
Universal 
pensions No No Public
Defined-benefit Redistribution and poverty prevention through a basic 
transfer for all in old age
Means-tested 
pensions No Yes Public
Defined-benefit Redistribution and poverty prevention through a basic 
transfer for the elderly poor
Pension-tested 
benefits No No Public
Defined-benefit Redistribution andpoverty prevention through minimum 
income security in old age
Minimum 
contributory 
pension
Yes No Public PAYG Defined-benefit 
(minimum 
benefit)
Redistribution and poverty 
prevention through minimum 
income security in old age
Social insurance 
pensions
Yes No Public PAYG Defined-benefit 
(earnings-
related)
Consumption smoothing 
through inter-generational 
transfers
Notional 
defined 
contribution
Yes No Public PAYG Defined-
contribution 
Consumption smoothing 
through non-financial 
individual pension credits
Occupational 
pension 
schemes
Yes No Employers Defined-benefit 
or defined-
contribution 
Consumption smoothing 
through worker savings and/
or employer benefit packages
Individual  
savings accounts
Yes No Generally private 
fully-funded
Defined-
contribution 
Consumption smoothing 
through individual savings
Source: Own elaboration. 
The Gender Dimensions 
of Pension Systems 8
3.2 
Old age poverty among women and men
Social transfers can have substantial poverty-reducing 
impacts in countries where comprehensive welfare 
systems exist. On average in the European Union 
(EU), the poverty rate before social transfers (includ-
ing pensions) is estimated at 44 per cent (Figure 2-1). 
As expected, the greatest impact of social transfers 
is found among older adults, who by and large rely 
on pensions as the main source of income. For the 
population aged 65 and over, the poverty rate climbs to 
88 per cent before transfers and drops to 14.5 per cent 
after transfers, indicating the relevance of the pension 
system for older adults in these countries. Pointing in 
the same direction, there is also evidence that a posi-
tive association exists in OECD countries between the 
share of social transfers in people’s income in old age 
and the level of old age poverty (ILO 2014: Fig. 4.2).
FIGURE 3-1
At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers in the European Union (28 countries), 2012
Cut-off point: 60% of median equivalized income after social transfers (percentages)
Source: Own elaboration based on European Commission, Eurostat Database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ (accessed 12 August 2014).
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Despite this positive poverty-reducing impact of social 
transfers, a gender gap remains: on average in the EU 
the post-transfers poverty rate for men aged 65 and over 
in 2012 was 12.1 per cent compared to 16.4 per cent for 
women (Table 3-2). Women’s poverty rate at older ages 
is higher than men’s in most EU countries. On the other 
hand, it should also be considered that poverty figures 
may not make gender gaps fully visible, since poverty in-
dicators based on household income implicitly assume 
that income is fully pooled within the household (and 
between women and men), which is not necessar-
ily the case. The figures also fail to include other crucial 
elements of well-being, particularly access to housing, 
healthcare and other social services (elderly home 
care, for instance). These services can be particularly 
important for older women who, as previously noted, 
live longer than men on average and are therefore more 
likely to become widows, live alone (greater housing 
costs) and lack care assistance by cohabiting members 
of family (greater need for elderly care services).
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3.3 
Gender gaps in pension coverage and benefits
The poverty-reducing impact of pension systems 
depends on the level and distribution of benefits. In 
countries with comprehensive pension systems and 
widespread coverage, most people rely on pensions 
as the main source of income in old age. In OECD 
countries, it has been estimated that over 80 per 
cent of income of the population aged 65 and over 
in the four bottom income deciles (40 per cent of the 
population with lowest income) comes from public 
transfers (OECD 2013: Fig. 2.5). In contrast, in countries 
where pension systems have limited coverage or offer 
inadequate benefits, older adults need to rely on other 
sources of income during old age, including extended 
participation in the labour market or family help in 
the forms of both income transfers and care. 
Table 3-3 presents an overview of pension coverage 
for the elderly and working population around the 
world.4 Data show the large coverage gaps that 
prevail for working-age population as well as for 
older adults in most world regions. Indeed, it is 
estimated that, on average, only just over half of 
the population in the world above the retirement 
age effectively receives a pension. Only in Western 
Europe, North America and Central and Eastern 
Europe do we find close to complete coverage in 
old age (above 90 per cent in all cases). In other 
4 Data on coverage can be either obtained from household 
surveys (the percentage of elderly people that receives a 
pension, or the percentage of workers who contribute to 
a pension scheme) or estimated from administrative re-
cords (as the ratio of pensioners or of contributors over the 
population of a certain age). The latter approach is used in 
coverage rates presented in Table 2-3 and the former for data 
presented in Figure2-2. The two measures are not strictly 
comparable.
TABLE 3-2 
At-risk-of-poverty rate by sex in Europe, 2012
 Total Men Women
European Union 
(28 countries)
14.5 12.1 16.4
Austria 15.1 11.5 17.8
Belgium 17.8 17.7 17.9
Bulgaria 28.2 19.3 34.3
Croatia 26.5 21.1 30.4
Cyprus 29.3 24.2 33.6
Czech Republic 6.0 2.7 8.4
Denmark 14.1 12.4 15.6
Estonia 17.2 11.2 20.1
Finland 18.4 11.9 23.3
France 9.4 8.0 10.5
Germany 15.0 13.3 16.6
Greece 17.2 15.9 18.3
Hungary 6.0 4.7 6.8
Iceland 4.5 4.6 4.5
Ireland 12.2 11.8 12.6
Source: European Commission n.d.
Notes: Cut-off point: 60 per cent of median equivalized income after social transfers (percentages)
 Total Men Women
Italy 16.3 13.1 18.7
Latvia 13.9 8.5 16.4
Lithuania 18.7 13.8 21.2
Luxembourg 6.1 3.6 8.0
Malta 17.3 19.0 15.9
Netherlands 5.5 5.5 5.4
Norway 9.3 3.8 13.9
Poland 14.0 9.4 16.8
Portugal 17.4 16.1 18.4
Romania 15.4 9.6 19.8
Slovakia 7.8 5.9 9.0
Slovenia 19.6 11.7 25.0
Spain 14.8 13.6 15.8
Sweden 17.7 10.2 23.5
Switzerland 29.9 24.9 34.0
United Kingdom 16.1 14.5 17.4
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TABLE 3-3 
Old age social security effective coverage, global estimates (percentages)
 Working-age coverage Old age coverage
Main regions Active contributors as a 
percentage of working age 
population (15–64)
Old age pension beneficiaries as a 
percentage of the population above 
statutory pension age
Africa 9.8 21.5
     North Africa 24.0 36.7
     Sub-Saharan Africa 5.8 16.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 27.6 56.1
North America 77.5 93.0
Western Europe 66.7 92.4
Central and Eastern Europe 48.9 94.3
Asia and the Pacific 25.6 47.0
Middle East 18.4 29.5
WORLD 29.7 51.5
Notes (based on ILO Notes from Concepts and Definitions for table B.9): Regional averages weighted by total population. Data corresponds to latest 
available figure, c.2010. Coverage is based on administrative records (Main source: ILO Social Security Inquiry; Indicator: old age pensioners recipient ratio 
above retirement age - CR-1f OA). The benefits covered are periodic cash retirement benefits. They can be means-tested or non-means-tested and provided 
through contributory or non-contributory schemes. Beneficiaries who receive supplementary benefits that complement other basic old age benefits (i.e., 
‘second-pillar’ schemes) are excluded to avoid double counting. To the extent possible, the numerator includes survivors’ and disability benefits once the 
beneficiary reaches the statutory pensionable age (or the age of 65). In other words, the numerator should capture all beneficiaries of an old age pension, 
whether they themselves were participants in a social security scheme (contributors) or not, for instance, family members of deceased contributors who 
receive a part of the latter’s pension. Both in the case of survivors’ and disability benefits, it is important to note that only those who fall within the age 
group are counted. The denominator corresponds to the total size of the population defined as above the statutory pensionable age or aged 65 or above 
(for further details, see ILO 2014, Concepts and Definitions for table B.9).
Source: Own elaboration, based on ILO 2014:83 (data for Fig. 4.8).
world regions coverage is substantially lower. In 
Africa, contributors represent a small share of the 
working-age population and pensioners are only a 
minority of older adults. In sub-Saharan Africa only 
5.8 per cent of the working-age population and 16.9 
per cent of older adults are covered. In Asia and the 
Pacific, as well as in the Middle East, pension cover-
age of older adults is also low, at 47 per cent and 
29.5 per cent, respectively. In Latin America, pension 
coverage is somewhat higher but still far from com-
plete, with pensioners representing 56.1 per cent 
of the population above the retirement age. Wide 
differences also exist among countries in each of 
these regions (see ILO 2014: Table B.9). 
Women tend to have lower coverage rates than 
men. Figure 2-2 presents gender-specific coverage 
rates for a number of countries for which recent 
data are available, showing important gender gaps 
in coverage in several of them. Household data from 
Latin America also point at large gender gaps in pen-
sion coverage in other countries apart from those 
presented in the figure (see Rofman and Oliveri 2011). 
However, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay have managed to reach high coverage rates 
for women and men, often combining contributory, 
semi-contributory and non-contributory pensions 
(see section 7). 
Some European countries also manage to achieve 
equally high coverage rates for women and men. 
This is not the case everywhere, however. In coun-
tries such as Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain, women continue to have lower pen-
sion coverage rates than men (ILO 2010b: Figure 
4.6). A recent study further illustrates the gender 
gaps in pension benefits and coverage in several 
European countries and the way in which different 
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pension pillars work for women and men (European 
Commission 2013, and Table 3-4). According to the 
Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE, Wave 2), coverage is generally high in the 
first pillar for both women and men, although 
women have lower coverage in some countries. On 
the other hand, in countries with a relatively large 
second pillar – such as Germany, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland – significant gender gaps ex-
ist in occupational pension coverage. The United 
Kingdom is another country where gender gaps in 
occupational pensions have been important (Foster 
2010: 32–33; see also Ginn 2003b; 2004; 2013 on the 
gender impacts of recent reforms). 
Pension benefit levels are also on average lower for 
women than men: in 2010 (weighted by population) 
men’s pensions were on average 39 per cent higher 
than women’s in the EU (European Commission 2013: 
34). These benefit gaps matter not only for gender 
equality but also for the capacity of pension systems 
to prevent old age poverty. Indeed, the mean month-
ly value of pension income for women (aged 65 and 
over) in 2010 was just above the national poverty 
line5 in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Germany, 
Latvia and Slovenia, equal to the poverty line in the 
United Kingdom, and below it in Bulgaria (75 per 
cent) and Cyprus (81 per cent) (ibid.: 36, Table 1.1). 
While these figures refer to an average of women/
men, as mentioned above specific events over 
5 The poverty line is the at-risk-of-poverty level for one mem-
ber household, from European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2010 (European Commission 
2013: 36, note 3 to Table 1.1.
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women’s lifecourses affect their pension entitle-
ments more. For instance, the data show that the 
gender gap is larger for women who have children. 
In France, for example, the gap in pensions is 19 per 
cent for women who had no children, 31 per cent for 
women who had one or two children and 50 per cent 
for women who had three or more children (ibid.: 62). 
A similar picture is found in other surveyed countries 
in Europe. This pattern shows the impacts that 
having a child can have on women’s labour market 
participation and earnings and, consequently, on 
pension benefits. 
TABLE 3-4 
Gender gap in pension coverage by pillar, 2006/2007
(percentage of people aged 65 and over)
Coverage rates 
Pillar	1 Pillar	2 Pillar	3
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Austria 98.5 88.6 11.0 4.9 1.8 4.3
Belgium 92.9 78.7 6.7 2.5 2.0 1.0
Czech 
Republic 96.5 98.9 4.0 5.8 1.4 0.9
Denmark 96.9 97.9 23.3 16.2 21.6 13.7
France 99.4 94.2 4.7 1.7 4.8 3.3
Germany 94.0 90.2 30.3 13.0 4.5 4.0
Greece 82.8 72.5 8.7 6.1 0.2 0.2
Italy 90.1 82.8 6.7 3.9 0.2 0.1
Netherlands 93.2 96.3 76.8 48.4 10.1 7.2
Poland 97.4 95.2 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.9
Spain 90.1 62.7 4.5 1.2 1.0 1.4
Sweden 94.5 95.6 64.8 69.0 21.3 14.9
Switzerland 93.2 98.0 60.7 27.9 5.7 7.3
Notes: … no data available.
Pillar 1: Includes statutory public pension schemes: public old age pension, public early or pre-retirement pension, public disability pension, public unemployment 
benefit, public survivor pension, public supplementary or second pension (for old age, disability, survivor) and public long-term insurance payments. 
Pillar 2: Includes occupational pensions: private occupational old age pension, private occupational early retirement pension, private occupational disability insur-
ance and private occupational survivor pension. 
Pillar 3: Includes individual supplementary provision: life insurance, private annuity or private personal pension, alimony, payments from charities and long-term 
care insurance payments. (See European Commission 2013, Appendix 2 for details).
Source: European Commission 2013: Table 10.2.
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4. 
CONTRIBUTORY SOCIAL 
INSURANCE PENSIONS 
AND GENDER
Social insurance pensions offer earnings-related benefits to workers who have contributed 
over a specified period of time. In these and other types of pension systems that link benefits 
to past employment and earnings, benefits tend to reflect women’s “cumulated disadvan-
tages of a lifetime’s involvement in a gender-biased labour market” (European Commission 
2013: 21). Indeed, when social protection entitlements are associated to paid employment, 
and no or insufficient mechanisms exist to recognize and reward other kinds of contributions 
that people make to society (such as unpaid work), gender inequalities in the labour market 
are transmitted to the social protection system (Razavi 2011). Having more limited contribu-
tion records, many women fail to meet the eligibility conditions to obtain a benefit of their 
own. When they do, their benefits tend to be lower than men’s, reflecting the joint impact of 
shorter periods of paid work, more part-time work and lower earnings. In some countries, this 
can especially harm low-income women who have lower (formal) labour market participation 
and may also lack access to derived benefits if they are single or divorced from/widowed by 
an informal worker with no pension rights. 
As explained earlier, some countries have nonethe-
less managed to ensure equal access to pension 
benefits for women and men under contributory 
social insurance systems of various types (European 
Commission 2013:40). Indeed, the extent to which 
gendered labour markets effectively affect wom-
en’s pension entitlements depends on specific 
aspects of pension design that are particularly 
relevant for gender equality. These aspects relate 
to some of the key features of pension design 
mentioned above: the conditions of entitlement; 
the link between contributions and benefits; and 
the mechanism for benefit indexation.6
6 Another gender-relevant pension design feature – family-
related components of pension systems – is dealt with 
separately in section 8. 
The first key relevant design feature, related to the 
conditions of entitlement, is the number of years of 
contributions required to get a pension (the ‘vesting 
period’). In contributory social insurance systems, 
workers are typically entitled to a retirement benefit 
when they reach the retirement age and have a mini-
mum number of years of work and/or contributions. 
Women find it harder than men to accumulate long 
contributory records. And although women’s labour 
market participation is increasing among younger 
cohorts, long vesting periods will continue to limit 
women’s access to retirement benefits for some time 
if no adequate instruments exist to compensate for 
periods of time dedicated to unpaid work.
In an attempt to contain pension expenditure and in-
troduce incentives for work and later retirement, over 
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the past few decades several countries have increased 
the minimum number of years of contribution re-
quired to obtain public pension benefits. This was 
common in the structural pension reforms in Latin 
America (Dion 2008). In Argentina, after contributory 
requirements to obtain a pension were increased to 30 
years, coverage rates of the elderly population (aged 
65 and over) declined from 86 to 73 per cent for men 
and from 73 to 65 per cent for women between 1994 
and 2004 (Rofman et al. 2009). The trend was only re-
versed about a decade later when a new programme 
was launched to make it possible for older adults with 
limited contributory records to obtain a benefit (Arza 
2012c). In Chile also, the contributory pension cover-
age rate fell several points between 1990 and 2006 
(Rofman et al. 2009). This motivated the incorporation 
of coverage issues in the policy agenda and in the pen-
sion reform passed in 2008.
The second key design feature is the benefit formula, 
in other words, the rules that specify how benefit 
levels are calculated for each pensioner. Benefit for-
mulas involve important policy decisions regarding 
what aims and values should be prioritized. The most 
salient of these is whether the policy goal should be 
equality in lifetime benefits (or in the ‘rates of return’ 
to past contributions), or in monthly pension benefits 
or replacement rates. This also relates to whether 
benefit formulas should promote a tight or loose link 
between contributions and benefits at the individual 
level. Benefit formulas that closely reflect earnings 
and contributory histories tend to generate lower 
benefits for women than men, while benefit formulas 
including flat or redistributive components favour 
women on average. Several more specific aspects of the 
benefit formula are also relevant for gender equality, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for example, the rules on how to fill career breaks for 
the calculation of benefits, including whether and 
what kinds of contribution credits exist for periods 
outside the labour market, the nature of derived ben-
efits, the period of earnings taken into account for the 
calculation of benefits and the existence of minimum 
benefits (see Jefferson 2009; European Commission 
2013: 30). Also important is the use of unisex tables 
for the calculation of benefits in defined contribution 
systems, to which we will return in section 5.
The third key pension design feature is the mecha-
nism for benefit indexation. This is essential to 
maintain the real value of pension benefits over the 
retirement period. Indexation is important for all 
pensioners but particularly so for women, who face 
higher risks of benefit depreciation over time due to 
their longer life spans. In the past decades, with the 
aim of reducing costs, most European countries have 
modified indexation rules, shifting from wage-index-
ation to price-indexation (Kohli and Arza 2010; OECD 
2013). If real earnings grow, price indexation can bring 
budget savings but entails a drop in the relative posi-
tion of pensioners vis-à-vis the working population. 
On the other hand, not every country has a regular 
benefit indexation mechanism,7 and in some cases 
regular indexation only applies to contributory but 
not non-contributory pensions. The impact of inad-
equate indexation on benefit levels is shown in the 
following calculation by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO): assuming a rise by 2 per cent of 
real earnings and prices 15 years after retirement, it is 
estimated that a pension benefit will drop to 74 per 
cent relative to wages if price indexation is applied 
and to only 55 per cent if no indexation is applied (ILO 
2014: Fig. 4.14).
7 See details in the World Bank Pension Database, http://
go.worldbank.org/IRHX8QBQU0 (accessed 8 February 2013).
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5. 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
SYSTEMS AND GENDER
Pension systems have been subject to substantial reform in contexts of changing socio-
economic environments and political priorities (UNRISD 2010; Huber and Stephens 2012). 
From the 1980s onwards, pension reform (often meaning retrenchment and privatization) has 
been on the policy agenda across countries and regions. In high-income countries, reforms 
were mainly oriented to contain the fiscal costs of population ageing and involved parametric 
adjustments such as less generous indexation rules, higher retirement ages, incentives to 
delay retirement and the development of individual pension savings to compensate for 
the projected fall of public pensions in the future (Kohli and Arza 2010). These reforms had 
gender-relevant impacts.8 Furthermore, in several countries the global crisis accelerated these 
parametric reforms in a context of fiscal austerity (see section 6). 
Reforms  went further in several countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America. 
Following the policy shift to the market promoted 
among others by the World Bank (see World Bank 
1994), structural pension reforms involved a partial 
or complete switch from public pay as you go (PAYG) 
social insurance pensions to privately managed, 
fully funded individual accounts. In these types of 
systems, each worker accumulates pension contri-
butions to finance her or his retirement benefits. 
Pension benefits are no longer calculated as a re-
placement rate of past earnings, as in public social 
insurance systems, but based on the balance in each 
worker’s individual account and life expectancy on 
retirement. Several countries adopted individual 
accounts over the 1990s and 2000s, following the 
previous experience of Chile in 1981 (Table 5-1)9 (see 
8 On pension reform and gender in Western Europe, see Meyer 
and Pfau-Effinger 2006; Frericks and Maier 2008; Frericks et 
al. 2009; Foster 2010, among others.
9 Table 5-1 includes all countries in which individual accounts 
became part of the mandatory pension system. In some 
cases, however, workers could choose to remain in the 
public PAYG system, which continued to exist in parallel to 
also Barrientos 1998; Fultz 2002; Müller 2002 and 
2003;Madrid 2003; Mesa-Lago 2006; Brooks 2009). 
While specific design features varied substantially 
across reforming countries – for instance, regarding 
the relative size of the private pillar (i.e., the share of 
mandatory wage contributions that were directed 
to it) – the overall trend was towards a stronger link 
between contributions and benefits.
The establishment of individual pension accounts 
has brought about new gender issues. First, benefit 
levels in individual accounts are directly based on past 
contributions and therefore the benefit each one can 
obtain more closely reflects working, earning and 
(especially) contributory histories. This can mean sub-
stantially lower pensions for individuals with limited 
or interrupted contributory histories, including many 
newly established systems of individual accounts (parallel 
systems). In other cases, individual accounts worked as an 
additional pillar on top of a public pension benefit (mixed 
systems). In still others, individual accounts completely 
replaced existing PAYG systems (substitutive systems) (see 
Mesa-Lago 2006;  2008).
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women, who need to rely on other redistributive pen-
sion pillars, if available. 
Second, these systems are designed to match lifetime 
benefits with lifetime contributions, and the benefit for-
mula thus needs to consider the number of years during 
which the person is expected to collect benefits. As a 
result, unlike in most public social insurance pensions, 
both effective retirement ages and life expectancies on 
retirement are taken into consideration.10 In most coun-
tries women’s retirement ages have been traditionally 
set some five years before men’s. Although this has been 
changing in recent decades (with women’s retirement 
ages often rising to the men’s value), differences remain 
in some countries, including several of those that have 
implemented individual accounts.11 With a lower retire-
ment age, women can stop working earlier but get 
lower monthly pension benefits because they have 
both fewer years of work to accumulate contributions 
and more years of retirement to distribute accumulated 
10  On the link between life expectancy and retirement benefits 
see also OECD 2011, chapter 5.
11  See ISSA 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2013; on pensionable ages for 
men and women, see OECD 2011: chapter 1.
funds. In countries where women used to retire earlier 
than men with no adjustment made to their pensions, 
the new systems come at a cost.
In some cases, gender gaps in life expectancy also mat-
ter for the benefits that women and men can obtain. 
In defined contribution systems, estimated life expec-
tancy on retirement is used to transform accumulated 
assets into a monthly pension benefit. Since women 
on average live longer than men, pension systems 
that use gender-specific life tables in the calculation 
of benefits (i.e., one life expectancy estimation for 
women and another one for men) generate still lower 
monthly benefits for women. In contrast, the use of 
unisex life tables generates equal monthly benefits 
for women and men who have equal pension fund 
accumulation and retire at the same age. While this 
involves a subsidy from the average men to the aver-
age women, gender-specific life tables, in contrast, 
privilege the actuarial link between contributions and 
benefits for each individual and offer higher benefits 
to men. As Fultz and Steinhilber (2003: 37–38) have 
underlined, unisex life tables better perform the social 
security function to pool the risk of longevity; paying 
TABLE 5-1 
Countries that have adopted mandatory, fully funded defined contribution pension schemes
Year implemented
Argentina 1994 (until 2008)
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1997
Chile 1981
Colombia 1994
Costa Rica 2000
Dominican Republic 2003
El Salvador 1998
Mexico 1997
Panama 2008
Peru 1993
Uruguay 1996
Bulgaria 2002
Croatia 2002
Notes: Includes countries in which mandatory pension contributions are paid into individual accounts. In some cases, affiliation was optional (and some or 
all workers could choose to stay in the public system).
Source: Own elaboration based on ISSA (2013, 2012a, 2012b, 2011); Muller (2010); World Bank 2013.
Year implemented
Estonia 2002
Hungary 1998 (until 2010)
Kazakhstan 1998
Latvia 2001
Lithuania 2004/05
Poland 1999
Romania 2008
Russian Federation 2003
Slovak Republic 2005
Sweden 1999
Kyrgyzstan 2010
Uzbekistan 2007
Nigeria 2005
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less to those who live longer works against it.12 Based 
on that, gender-specific life tables have been consid-
ered discriminatory in several high-income countries 
and regulations have restricted their use.13 In contrast, 
most countries in Latin America allow the use of 
gender-specific life tables in their individual accounts 
(see James 2012:16; also Bertranou 2001; Bertranou 
and Arenas de Mesa 2003; Dion 2008).14
Gender inequalities were also an issue in several 
Central and Eastern European countries that went 
through structural reforms and adopted mandatory 
individual accounts (Fultz and Steinhilber 2003; Fultz 
2006; Müller 2010). For the case of Poland, Balcerzak-
Paradowska et al. (2003: 237, 240) estimated that 
benefits would decline substantially for both women 
and men after the reform and that the gender gap 
would rise, with women’s benefits worth about 74 per 
cent of men’s at age 65 in the new system (compared 
to 81per cent in the old system). They also highlighted 
two favourable aspects of reform for women: the 
possibility to split pension accumulation between 
the spouses after divorce (if it constitutes common 
property) and the elimination of the minimum period 
of covered work required to obtain a benefit (ibid.: 230, 
232; see also Fultz et al. 2003). In Hungary, the adoption 
of mandatory private individual accounts was accom-
panied by equal retirement ages and unisex life tables 
(Fultz and Steinhilber 2003; Jefferson 2009: 138). Poland 
later made that decision as well (James 2012).
12 Other scholars, however, argue that unisex life tables gener-
ate problems of implementation in annuity markets when 
annuities are not mandatory, because men may avoid an-
nuities generating a form of adverse selection in which the 
market ends up being dominated by the risky group (women, 
who have higher longevity) (James 2012: 15).
13  EU Directives have ruled out their application in the 
European context and unisex life tables are required for 
mandatory fully funded and occupational pensions (Müller 
2010; James 2012: 15–16; European Commission 2013: 30). The 
US Supreme Court has dealt with the issue for employment-
based pension funds and established that employers must 
pay equal monthly benefits to women and men (Jefferson 
2009: 134;James 2012: 16).
14 On defined contribution systems and gender gaps in 
Latin America, see Bertranou 2001; Rofman and Grushka 
2003;Arenas de Mesa and Gana Cornejo 2003; Marco 
2004; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2006; Dion 2008; Kritzer et al. 
2011;CENDA 2011. 
Structural pension reforms did not always lead to 
the adoption of individual accounts. Instead, some 
countries implemented another pension model that 
situates somewhat between public social insurance 
and privately administered individual accounts. This 
system is called notional (or non-financial) defined 
contribution (NDC) and was implemented in countries 
including Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden. The NDC 
system is similar to individual accounts in that the 
benefits reflect lifetime contributions and consider 
the number of years during which workers are expect-
ed to collect benefits (life expectancy on retirement). 
However, unlike individual accounts, NDC systems 
are publicly administered and involve no financial 
accumulation. Instead, revenues from workers’ con-
tributions continue to be directed to pay for benefits 
in a PAYG model. As a result, NDC systems avoid both 
the transition costs and the financial market risks of 
individual accounts (Holzmann et al. 2012a). 
NDC systems also have gender impacts. They have 
been mostly motivated by fiscal concerns and the 
need to cope with the costs of ageing. Since they more 
closely link contributions and benefits, they tend to 
transfer gender inequalities in the labour market into 
the retirement period as defined contribution fully 
funded pensions do.15 As defined contribution systems, 
NDC schemes cannot guarantee that benefits result-
ing from contribution records will be adequate for all 
and need to be combined and complemented with 
effective redistributive pillars (such as minimum pen-
sions or basic non-contributory pensions). The shift to 
NDC systems can particularly affect women’s pensions 
as long as they have fewer years of contributions over 
their lifetime and a history of lower earnings, which 
becomes more relevant for the final distribution than 
in traditional social insurance schemes. The extent to 
which other pension pillars can compensate for the 
loss varies from country to country and is likely to be 
influenced as well by the fiscal space at the time of 
reform in each particular case.
15  For an analysis of gender and NDC, see several contributions 
in Holzmann et al. 2012b.
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6. 
PENSION REFORM AND 
GENDER AFTER THE 
GLOBAL CRISIS
The global financial crisis impacted on pension systems in several ways. The crisis affected 
the revenues of public systems as well as the value of private pension funds. In 2008, pension 
funds lost 23 per cent of their investment value in OECD countries (about US$5.4 trillion). This 
was a substantial loss of worker’s savings and a particularly serious problem for older workers, 
who cannot always wait for market recovery to retire (OECD 2009). Public pension schemes 
also suffered from the negative impact of unemployment on public social security revenues. 
At the same time, in a crisis context, the role of social security programmes as economic and 
social stabilizers came back to the fore. Social security systems were incorporated in a number 
of stimulus packages, and the need to develop these systems further became more apparent 
in those countries lacking adequate protection (Behrendt et al. 2011; see also ISSA 2009; 
Bonnet et al. 2012). Pension systems had a role to contain the cost of the crisis on older adults. 
But while poverty rates among old people fell on average in the OECD over the crisis period 
(from 15.1 per cent in 2007 to 12.8 per cent in 2010), the challenge is to maintain the poverty-
reducing capacity of pension systems in a context of growing austerity (OECD 2013: 13).
The crisis generated two main reform directions. In 
countries with large public pension systems, like most 
OECD countries, the crisis reinforced cost-containment 
reforms that were already on the agenda in previous 
decades. Reforms continued to tighten eligibility condi-
tions, strengthen the link between contributions and 
benefits, increase retirement ages, change indexation 
rules from wages to prices and restrict early-retirement 
options (Kohli and Arza 2010; Ortiz and Cummins 2013; 
OECD 2013). As a recent OECD report concludes, pen-
sion reforms undertaken over the past two decades 
have reduced the pension promise for workers who en-
ter the labour market today in OECD countries (OECD 
2013: 13). Each year of contributions results in lower 
pensions, and more years of work are required to get 
adequate benefits. As a result, “[p]eople who do not 
have full contribution careers will struggle to achieve 
adequate retirement incomes in public schemes, and 
even more so in private pension schemes which com-
monly do not redistribute income to poorer retirees” 
(ibid.: 14). Pension reforms have cut the benefit that 
current workers can expect to receive on retirement. 
Furthermore, the retrenchment of public pensions, 
together with greater reliance on private individual 
pensions, may also increase inequality among retirees 
in the future (ibid.: 15). 
Greece and Spain, two of the hardest hit by the inter-
national crisis, were also among the main reformers. In 
Spain, pension reforms were part of austerity measures 
undertaken by the Government to reduce the public 
deficit. Reforms increased the retirement age from 65 
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to 67 (between 2013 and 2027), as well as the number 
of years of contributions required for a full pension, 
and introduced incentives to remain in the labour 
market after the age of retirement. While tightened 
eligibility requirements are likely to disproportionally 
affect women, reforms have also established a gradual 
increase for survivor benefits for widows aged 65 and 
older who have no public pension entitlement of their 
own. Other gender-relevant measures included that 
common law couples became eligible for survivor ben-
efits and childcare credits were set to expand gradually 
from 2013 to 2019 (US-SSA 2011; OECD 2013: 38).
In Greece, pension reform followed the onset of the 
crisis and was a key element in the agreement with 
the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
restore financial stability (US-SSA 2010). The 2010 pen-
sion reform was expected to reduce future pension 
expenditures and cut benefit replacement rates from 
an average of 75 per cent of wages to around 60 per 
cent. Reform increased the retirement age for women 
(gradually rising from 60 to 65 to match that of men) 
and established an automatic adjustment of retire-
ment ages beginning in 2020 to reflect changes in life 
expectancy. It also restricted early retirement, increased 
the minimum contribution period to get a full pension, 
froze benefits during 2011–2013 (later extended to 2015) 
and established price indexation thereafter. The pension 
formula was also made less generous with a reduction 
of the average accrual rate. Subsequent changes were 
approved in 2011 and 2012, including an increase in the 
statutory retirement ages from 65 to 67 for a full pen-
sion, a cut in monthly pensions greater than 1,000 euros 
by 5–15 per cent (depending on income) and a reduction 
of bonuses previously paid to public sector employees 
(US-SSA 2011; 2012b; 2012c; OECD 2013). 
Other countries also introduced important pension 
reforms in the post-crisis period. Italy accelerated the 
transition from defined benefit to NDC pensions. Ireland 
increased the retirement age from 65 to 66 in 2014 with 
a planned further rise to 67 from 2021 and 68 from 2028. 
The United Kingdom introduced a nationwide automat-
ic enrolment retirement savings systems for all workers 
not already covered by a private pension. Several coun-
tries, including Austria, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia, 
froze automatic adjustments for all pensioners except 
the lowest earners. Finland and Norway also introduced 
measures to link public benefits to life expectancies. 
Many countries undertook actions to encourage lon-
ger working lives, including higher retirement ages, 
financial incentives to work longer and the reduction 
of early retirement schemes. Simulations by the OECD 
suggest that, taken together, these reforms will gener-
ate a reduction of pension benefits across the earnings 
distribution, although most countries aimed to protect 
the lowest earners (OECD 2013). 
The second reform direction observed after the onset 
of the crisis involves countries with ongoing transi-
tions from PAYG to fully funded individual accounts. In 
several of these cases the crisis opened a second round 
of reform with the aim of addressing budgetary chal-
lenges. This was the case of some Central and Eastern 
European countries that had relatively recently imple-
mented structural reforms. Through various specific 
measures, several countries reallocated contributions 
from individual accounts back to the public PAYG sys-
tem (US-SSA 2012a). Countries such as Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic significantly 
reduced the size of the second pillar of fully funded 
individual accounts, either temporarily or permanently. 
In Poland, for example, contributions to the private 
scheme were progressively reduced from 7.3 to 2.3 per 
cent of earnings. The most structural reformer in the 
region was Hungary, which in 2010 effectively closed 
down the systems of individual accounts implemented 
in 1998 (Calvo et al. 2010; Kritzer et al. 2011; US-SSA 2012a; 
OECD 2013). In Latin America, Argentina also ended the 
private system of individual accounts in 2008 to return 
to a fully public defined benefit and PAYG pension 
model (Arza 2012b). 
Given the various kinds of effects that the crisis has 
had on pension systems and the wide range of policy 
measures taken in response, some of which still need 
to be implemented and may have an effect several 
years from now, the impacts of the crisis on gender 
equality in pensions are still not fully visible. However, 
since women are more dependent on public support in 
old age, they are likely to suffer most from pension cuts, 
including less generous indexation rules, because they 
live longer, receive benefits for a longer period and thus 
face higher risks of benefit depreciation over time. 
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7. 
NON-CONTRIBUTORY 
PENSIONS AND GENDER 
EQUALITY
The limitations of contributory pension systems to offer protection to informal and unpaid 
workers have led many countries to increasingly recognize the importance of non-contributo-
ry (NC) pensions (also called ‘social pensions’). HelpAge International now registers 107 NC old 
age pension schemes around the world, with various designs, scope and impacts (see HelpAge 
International 2014). NC pensions can contribute to filling coverage gaps, reducing poverty in 
old age and enhancing women’s access to basic old age protection. They can be particularly 
important for individuals with limited participation in the formal labour market who are 
unlikely to meet the vesting periods of contributory social insurance pensions or accumulate 
sufficient savings in individual pension accounts. There is a wide variety of NC pensions across 
countries, and their capacity to make a difference depends on the breath of coverage as well 
as on the benefit level they offer (Table 7-1). 
In Latin America, most countries have means-tested 
NC systems but universal pensions also exist in 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Mexico City. The 
Bolivian NC pension is an interesting example of how 
a universal pension can get established in a country 
that previously had a very limited level of old age 
protection (see Box 7-1) and now provide close to 
complete old age pension coverage. Coverage is also 
high in Brazil, partly thanks to a rural pension, equal 
to the minimum wage, for which only a proof of past 
rural work –not contributions – is required. Mexico is 
another interesting case that has travelled the path 
towards widespread coverage quite rapidly in the past 
two decades (Willmore 2014). The Pensión Alimentaria 
(Maintenance Pension), a universal old age pension 
for residents of Mexico City, was first paid in 2001 and 
legislated as a right in 2003 for older adults aged 70 or 
over (reduced to 68 or over in 2009). This experience 
encouraged the development of a number of NC pen-
sion schemes at the regional and national level. One 
of these was 70 y más (70 and over), a pension-tested 
modest benefit initially restricted to older adults in 
small towns and rural areas, subsequently extended 
to the rest of the country. The age of eligibility was 
reduced to 65 and the benefit is now a flat transfer 
equivalent to about US$39.9 per month (Table 7-1, see 
also Willmore 2014). 
NC pensions can have progressive distributional 
impacts across gender and income strata. They tend 
to favour lower income groups: Figure 6-1 shows 
that while contributory pensions are stratified 
towards the top, NC pensions are either received 
mainly by people in the bottom income quintiles 
(means-tested systems) or uniformly distributed 
across income groups (universal systems). In Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), for instance, the universal NC 
benefit Renta Dignidad covers older adults across all 
income quintiles, in clear contrast with the distribu-
tion of benefits in the contributory pension system, 
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which are concentrated at the top. In Chile, Costa 
Rica and Ecuador, means-tested NC benefits are also 
particularly relevant for people in the lowest income 
quintiles. In Chile, 40.3 per cent of the elderly in the 
bottom income quintile received NC benefits in 2009 
(compared to 10.8 per cent at the top), in Costa Rica 
17.5 per cent at the bottom (compared to 2.9 per 
cent at the top) and in Ecuador 45.6 per cent at the 
bottom (compared to 7.3 per cent in the top). NC pen-
sions also tend to favour women, since they are most 
likely to lack other types of pensions. In Argentina, 
for instance, where a programme oriented to expand 
coverage to the elderly with insufficient contributory 
records was implemented in recent years, the ma-
jority of new benefits were received by women and 
women’s pension coverage rate at age 65 increased 
to 92.4 per cent in 2010 (Rofman and Oliveri 2011; see 
also MTEySS 2012: 19; Arza 2012c).
NC pensions have also become increasingly relevant 
in several other countries in the Global South. In 
Africa, contributory pensions cover a very limited 
percentage of the population and most people work 
beyond the legal retirement age or depend on fam-
ily help during old age. In the past decades, several 
African countries have developed NC pensions that 
have achieved high coverage rates either under 
means-tested or universal designs. Mauritius and 
South Africa have been pioneers in this regard. The 
South African older persons grant was initially intro-
duced in 1928 as a social safety net for white people 
not covered by occupational pensions. It was later 
gradually extended to the black majority, initially 
under different conditions and benefit levels, to fi-
nally reach full parity. The benefit is means tested 
and payable to women and men aged 60 or older. In 
2013, the scheme provided about 2.9 million benefits 
of around US$125 per month (Table 7-1) The grant has 
been found to have positive impacts on poverty re-
duction and income redistribution (Burns et al. 2005: 
105; Barrientos 2005); to have an extended impact on 
younger generations who benefit from these grants 
in multi-generational households (Case and Deaton 
1998: 1330; Duflo 2003); to make it possible for grand-
parents to support grandchildren (ILO 2010a: 81); and 
to significantly improve the status of women in rural 
households (Razavi 2007: 391; ILO 2010a: 81). 
In Mauritius, the scheme was first implemented in 
1950 and became universal in 1958. All individuals aged 
60 and over are eligible for a benefit worth around 
US$118.5 per month at a cost of about 2.18 per cent of 
GDP (Table 7-1). In 2010, about 56.8 per cent of people 
benefiting from the scheme were women (Willmore 
2006; ILO 2013). Botswana and Namibia also have uni-
versal pension schemes with high coverage that were 
established or extended in the 1990s. The Namibian 
social pension was created in 1949 for white citizens, 
extended (at a lower benefit) to black Namibians in 1973 
and made universal in the early 1990s (Pelham 2007; 
Hujo and Cook 2012). All Namibians are now eligible at 
the age of 60, and the entitlement is unconditional and 
independent of assets, income or other pensions. 
In Asia, several countries have also developed and 
expanded NC pensions in recent years to cover the 
unprotected elderly population (see Handayani and 
Babajanian 2012; Hujo and Cook 2012). Countries such as 
Bangladesh, India, Korea and Thailand have NC pensions 
providing old age benefits to millions of people. The 
Korean Basic Old Age Pension is a means-tested pension 
established in 2007 that provides benefits to around 3.6 
million people (HelpAge International 2014). The largest 
scheme is the Indian Indira Gandhi National Old Age 
Pension scheme, a means-tested NC pension provided to 
over 17 million beneficiaries (Table 7-1). Bangladesh is an-
other country offering modest protection to a relatively 
large population. The Old Age Allowance was established 
there in 1998 as a social assistance programme to reduce 
extreme poverty and destitution among older people 
and widows and, targeted to low-income older adults, it 
reaches about 2.5 million people. Bangladesh also runs 
a separate NC programme for widows (the Widow and 
Distressed Women Allowance Programme), which was 
implemented in 1997–1998 to provide cash transfers to 
destitute women who are widow or deserted by their 
husbands, and had about 920,000 beneficiaries in 2010 
(ILO 2013). 
Finally, the case of Thailand is an example of how a 
NC pension can expand progressively to reach broad 
coverage. An Old Age Allowance was established in 
1993 as a means-tested system providing financial as-
sistance to needy individuals aged 60 or over. In 2009 
this was transformed to a pension-tested scheme, and 
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TABLE 7-1 
Non-contributory pensions in selected countries
Country Name of scheme Year introduced US$ Targeting Number of recipients
Total cost 
(% of GDP)
Bangladesh Old Age Allowance 1998 3.9 Means-tested       2,475,000 0.08%
Bolivia, Plurina-
tional State of
Renta Dignidad or Renta 
Universal de Vejez (previ-
ously Bonosol)
1997 (Bonosol) 36.2 Universal          838,866 1.08%
Botswana State old age pension 1996 25.9 Universal            91,446 0.26%
Brazil Previdencia Rural (Rural Pension) 1963 289.1
Work in 
agricultural or 
subsistence 
production.
      5,992,078 0.98%
Brazil BPC (Continuous Cash Benefit) 1996 289.1 Means-tested       1,822,346 0.26%
Chile
PBS-Vejez and APS-Vejez (Old 
Age Basic Solidarity Pension 
and Solidarity Pension 
Payment)
2008 164.4 Means-tested       1,000,806 …
Costa Rica Programa Régimen No Contributivo 1974 138.4 Means-tested            83,438 0.37%
Ecuador
Pension para Adultos 
Mayores (Pension for Older 
People)
2003 (in current form) 35.0 Means-tested          625,001 0.24%
Georgia Old Age Pension 2006 56.5 Universal          662,000 2.96%
Guatemala
Programa de aporte 
económico o del Adulto 
Mayor 
2005 51.4 Means-tested          103,125 0.13%
India Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme
1995 (2007 in  
current form) 3.3 Means-tested    17,233,586 0.03%
Jamaica
The Programme for 
Advancement through 
Health and Education 
2001 8.9 Means-tested            51,846 0.04%
Mauritius Basic Retirement Pension
1950 (first 
implemented), 1958 
(became universal)
118.5 Universal          180,770 2.18%
Mexico 65 y mas 2007 (70 y más)  2013 (65 y más) 39.9
Pensions-
tested       5,100,000 0.20%
Mozambique Programa de Subsido Social Basico 1992 8.5 Means-tested          270,000 0.19%
Namibia Old Age Pension (OAP) 1949 (for whites),  1992 (universal) 60.2 Universal          150,000 0.56%
Nepal Old Age Allowance 1995 (first payment) 2008 (extended) 5.3
Pensions-
tested          635,938 0.32%
Panama 100 a los 70 2009 50.0 Pensions-tested            86,392 0.17%
South Africa Older Persons Grant
1927/8 (for whites) 
1944 (whole popula-
tion), 1996 (full parity)
125.1 Means-tested       2,924,511 1.15%
Thailand Old Age Allowance
1993, extended to 
those without  
pensions in 2009
19.2 Pensions-tested       5,698,414 0.32%
Uruguay Programa de Pensiones No-Contributivas 1919 297.9 Means-tested            33,436 0.24%
… No data
Notes: Means-tested schemes test eligibility on individual or household income from various sources (benefits, work, capital, etc.). Pension-tested schemes 
test eligibility on receipt of other pension income and thus work as a minimum pension guarantee. Regional schemes apply only to specific regions or 
geographical areas.
Source: Helpage International 2014. (Number of benefits and benefit levels Brazil updated by the author with data for 2013).
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all individuals aged 60 or over who are not in public el-
derly facilities and do not receive a permanent income 
(other pensions or public wages) are eligible. Coverage 
increased from 1.8 million in 2008 to 5.7 million in 2010. 
The benefit is currently about US$19 per month and in-
creases with age up to approximately US$31 for people 
aged 90 or over (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada 2011; 
HelpAge International 2014, and Table 7-1).
The expansion of NC pensions in several countries 
has been a positive policy trend for the protection of 
women as well as low-income and informal workers. 
As mentioned above, NC pensions can be particularly 
relevant for women, who they are more likely to lack 
contributory pensions. Furthermore, due their greater 
life expectancy, more women benefit even in universal 
schemes that reach everyone uniformly. For instance, 
54.6 per cent of benefits in the Bolivian universal pen-
sion Renta Dignidad are received by women simply 
because there are more women than men above the 
retirement age (Escobar Loza et al. 2013: 35). Something 
similar happens in Mauritius, where in 2011 women 
BOX 7-1 
Non-contributory	pension	benefits	in	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia:	Bonosol	and	Renta	Dignidad
Bolivia stands out in Latin America for its universal 
non-contributory old age pension. ‘Bono Solidario’ 
or ‘Bonosol’ was first established in 1996–1997 as 
an old age transfer for all Bolivians aged 65 and 
over independent of work, income or contribu-
tions. The benefit was created as a mechanism 
to distribute the shares of public enterprises 
undergoing a process of capitalization (partial 
privatization) among Bolivian citizens aged 21 or 
older by 31 December 1995. Thus the benefit was 
universal (every older adult was eligible) but co-
hort-restricted (only Bolivian citizens born before 
1975 were entitled). It was first paid in May 1997, 
only one month before the general presidential 
election. Shortly after, the scheme was replaced 
by the less generous Bolivida, but it was reinsti-
tuted a few years later in 2002.   
Thanks to Bonosol, most elderly Bolivians could 
for the first time receive a pension benefit. In 1997, 
364,261 benefits were paid for a yearly value of 
about US$248. In 2003, the number of payments 
reached 493,437 and the benefit was worth about 
US$240 per year. Shortly after the nationaliza-
tion of hydrocarbons in May 2006, Bonosol was 
replaced by ‘Renta Dignidad’. The new benefit was 
first paid in February 2008 as a universal pension 
for all Bolivians. The new regulations lifted the 
cohort restriction, reduced the eligibility age to 60 
years and introduced new sources of funding.
All Bolivians are now eligible for Renta Dignidad, 
with the only conditions being to reach the re-
tirement age, to be resident in the country and 
to receive no earnings from the public budget. 
Since May 2013, the benefit is worth about US$36 
per month. People receiving contributory pension 
benefits are also entitled, but get a reduced benefit 
of about US$29.2 per month. By 2013 the number 
of beneficiaries had increased to over 838 thou-
sand people. The benefit is mainly financed with 
resources from the Direct Hydrocarbon Tax, with a 
total cost of about 1 per cent of GDP in 2012.
In a country with high levels of inequality in the dis-
tribution of income and access to pensions, Bonosol 
and Renta Dignidad have contributed towards 
income equality in old age across social class, oc-
cupation, region and gender lines. The benefits have 
been particularly important for women as well as 
for low-income groups more broadly, and for rural 
and informal workers who are more likely to lack 
contributory pensions. In 2012 women received 54.6 
per cent of total Renta Dignidad payments. A recent 
impact-evaluation survey (Encuesta de Hogares 
a Personas Adultos Mayores– EPAM 2011) finds a 
positive impact of Renta Dignidad on household 
income, consumption and the reduction of poverty 
(see Escobar Lozaet al. 2013).
Sources: Molina 2006; Willmore 2006; Müller 2009; Rofman and 
Oliveri 2011; Ticona Gonzales 2011; Arza 2012a; Escobar Loza et al. 2013; 
and Table 7-1.
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represented 56.6 per cent of total beneficiaries of the 
universal Basic Retirement Pension (Mauritius 2011: 
Table 1.1). And in Chile, about 71.8 per cent of the means-
tested Basic State Pensions for old age were directed to 
women in 2013 (Superintendencia de Pensiones 2013). 
While coverage rates have improved (sometimes 
substantially) in many countries, thanks to NC pen-
sions, a key challenge is benefit adequacy. Indeed, 
the level of benefits provided by NC schemes is often 
too modest. Given the large differences between 
contributory and NC pension benefit levels, even full 
NC coverage does not necessarily mean equal pro-
tection or equal rights. In fact, most countries have 
adopted means-tested designs in their NC pension 
pillars and universal schemes exist only in a few of 
them. Means-tested schemes have known limita-
tions (Mkandawire 2005; Ortiz and Cummins 2013). 
They often require that no other pensions or income 
is received in the household, thus limiting married 
women’s right to a pension of their own when their 
husbands work or have a pension. In addition, they 
are not always effective at reaching the people they 
aim to target, have higher administrative costs and 
often pose administrative hurdles for people to claim 
benefits.16 These are some of the reasons why pen-
sion-tested benefits (which only consider whether 
the individual receives a pension) and universal 
benefits (to which everyone is eligible) can foster old 
age security for all in a better way. Eligible people can 
be singled out easily with no invasive or stigmatiz-
ing tests of means, income or assets. If established 
as a right with no waiting lists and easy application 
procedures these types of schemes can also limit 
discretion in benefit allocation and clientelistic use. 
16 For more details on targeting and social pensions, see 
Helpage International n.d..
FIGURE 7-1
Coverage of old age contributory and non-contributory pensions in selected Latin American 
countries, by household income quintile
* Bolivia, Plurinational State of
Note: Data corresponds to 2007 in Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 2008 in Costa Rica and 2009 in Chile and Ecuador.
Source: Own elaboration, based on data from Rofman and Oliveri 2011.
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8. 
FAMILY-RELATED 
COMPONENTS OF 
PENSION SYSTEMS
In addition to NC pensions, there are at least three components or regulations in contributory 
pension systems that can also be particularly important for women: (1) derived benefits for 
widows, (2) pension rights for divorcees and (3) contribution credits for caregivers. In one way or 
another, they all address the protection of women in old age while considering their role in the 
family. However, the basis for the entitlement and the family model they assume and promote 
differ among them. 
8.1 
Derived benefits for widows
Widow’s pensions are an exemplary expression of 
the male breadwinner model and a form of sup-
ported familialism (Saraceno and Keck 2011: 390). 
Based on traditional family patterns and gender 
roles, these benefits have been oriented to provide 
economic support for family members (in most 
cases, wives) after the death of the partner. Most 
contributory social insurance systems offer survivor 
pensions, but there is substantial cross-country 
variation in the types and amounts of benefits they 
provide. In most cases, widows’ pensions aim at 
status maintenance, and benefits are calculated 
as a percentage of the deceased partner’s benefit 
or earnings. In general, widow’s benefits are lower 
than retirement pensions, at around 50 to 80 per 
cent of the deceased’s benefit (Choi 2006: 16). In 
contrast, some countries (e.g., Ireland, Lithuania and 
the United Kingdom)offer only a flat-rate benefit to 
survivors, while others (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) 
have a non-familial approach to old age protec-
tion, paying no benefits to survivors but providing 
everyone with access to a universal basic pension 
(Saraceno and Keck 2011: 392).
Over the past decades, derived benefits have been 
put under greater scrutiny. Since the underlying 
basis of entitlement for widows’ pensions has 
traditionally been economic dependence, these 
benefits have been criticized for reinforcing tradi-
tional gender norms and naturalizing the role of 
women as care providers economically dependent 
on their husbands. Widow’s pensions have also 
been losing effectiveness for the protection of 
elderly women as families change. Higher divorce 
rates and cohabitation, falling marriage rates and 
greater labour market participation of women have 
challenged traditional families and the assumption 
of the dependent wife. 
Widow’s benefits have also raised distributional di-
lemmas in defined benefit systems since they entail 
a redistribution of resources from single and divorced 
women and men to married couples and, in some 
cases, from dual-career to single-earner families as 
well. Some of these transfers may seem inequitable, 
for example, when childless married women who 
have never entered the labour market receive benefits 
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subsidized by single or cohabiting mothers who have 
combined paid work and care (Ginn 2003a: 495, 
cited in Jefferson 2009: 131). In many earnings-related 
systems, women have to choose between their own 
pension and the widow’s pension, and in some coun-
tries widow’s pensions are also phased out against 
wages. In the United States, for instance, the widow’s 
benefit is offset against other pensions and wages 
prior to retirement age, which can generate an im-
plicit disincentive for women to engage in paid work 
(James 2012: 26). 
At the same time, not every woman is entitled to 
a widow’s pension. Women who are married to 
an informal worker as well as divorced and single 
women often lack access to these benefits. In 
countries where contributory pension coverage is 
low and stratified, low-income women are often 
excluded twice: they lack both a retirement pen-
sion benefit of their own (for performing unpaid 
or informal work over their lifetimes) and a derived 
pension from their husbands (for being married 
to or cohabiting with an informal worker). As a 
result, in countries with incomplete and stratified 
coverage, derived benefits may end up increasing 
the total transfer that the state makes to formally 
employed (often higher income) families. 
Some countries have recently promoted substantial 
changes in survivor pensions. Benefits have been cut 
or significantly reduced, or they are being phased out, 
their duration restricted, or eligibility subjected to a 
means test (Saraceno and Keck 2011). Countries that 
have adopted NDC pension systems have continued 
to cover widows with a separate PAYG defined benefit 
scheme or have eliminated survivor benefits altogeth-
er (James 2012: 26). In Sweden, the widow’s pension 
was abolished in 1990 for women born in 1945 or later 
and replaced by a readjustment benefit to last only 
one year for women and men under the age of 65. At 
age 65 both women and men are entitled to the guar-
anteed pension if they have no other pension income 
and 40 years of residence in Sweden. The change 
was significant because benefits were individualized 
(i.e., not derived from family position) and the family 
ceased to be considered the primary economic unit 
(Stahlberg 2012: 72).
The shift from defined benefit to fully funded defined 
contribution individual accounts in some countries 
also brought about changes in derived benefits. 
Fully funded defined contribution schemes provide 
individualized pensions that aim to be distribution-
ally neutral. In these systems, derived benefits can 
be replaced by joint annuities, which incorporate 
a widow’s benefit in case of death. In a number of 
Latin American countries with defined contribution 
pensions, joint annuities are required. For an equal 
fund value, married men who buy a joint annuity get 
a lower individual benefit than single men because 
the right to additional benefit (the widow’s pension) 
is contracted with the same fund (James 2012: 27). 
However, in other countries joint-annuities are not 
mandatory and evidence from the United Kingdom 
shows that when joint annuities are voluntary, the 
majority of men choose individual annuities (James 
2012). In contrast, NDC systems do not currently per-
mit joint annuities.
Should widow’s pensions be abandoned in the 
benefit of full individualization? The transition from 
a male breadwinner model to de-familiarized pen-
sion systems raises complex policy dilemmas from 
a gender equality perspective. While there is a trend 
towards greater autonomy and choice in family pat-
terns and gender roles, women and men are not fully 
individualized. Gender inequalities in the distribu-
tion of paid and unpaid work remain substantial. 
So although in the pursuit of gender equality in 
work and family roles it is important to reorient 
pension systems away from the traditional family 
model, it may not yet be possible to simply assume 
equal life-course patterns or full individualization 
if the protection of women is to be guaranteed. 
Retrenchment of survivor pension can result in ef-
fectively lower protection for women in a context in 
which their individual pension rights are not always 
guaranteed. In countries such as Austria, Germany 
and Spain, widowed women obtain most of their 
income from survivor pensions (Ahn 2004: Table 
6). Many women belonging to generations close 
to retirement who have limited paid work records 
now face harder conditions to access contributory 
benefits (for instance, longer contributory periods 
required).Simply assuming that each individual will 
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become self-sufficient with respect to pension provi-
sion because everyone will be in the labour market 
may run ahead of social reality and turn out to 
 
exacerbate existing inequalities (Lewis 2007: 276–277). 
So policies oriented to enhance women’s autonomy in 
pension benefits need to address these issues. 
8.2
Pension rights for divorcees
One of the challenges faced by traditional pension 
schemes in a context of changing families is to 
guarantee pension rights after divorce, in particular 
for women who have limited participation in the 
labour market during marriage and thus accumu-
late insufficient contribution records of their own. 
Some countries have mechanisms to protect pension 
entitlements after divorce (Choi 2006: 24–25). These 
provisions take basically two forms: special benefits 
for divorcees or regulations for pension sharing (or 
‘pension splitting’) after divorce. 
Pension sharing is based on the idea of the common 
marital property of pension contributions (and en-
titlements). The main drawback is that in one-earner 
couples this can generate two inadequate benefits: 
for example, in Germany and Switzerland, an even 
division of an average earner’s pension has been es-
timated to generate two benefits of 22.9 per cent and 
38.7 per cent of the economy-wide average earnings, 
respectively (Choi 2006: 25). Some analysts, however, 
consider that the main advantage of pension sharing 
is that it does not involve transfers from third parties 
(as happens with survivor benefits in defined benefit 
systems), thus avoiding the above-mentioned distri-
butional dilemma (Klerby et al. 2012). On the other 
hand, some countries that have a pension model 
based on individual rather than derived pension 
rights, such as Finland and Sweden, and protect di-
vorcees in a different way by making everyone eligible 
for a pension benefit independent of past or present 
family situation (Choi 2006; European Commission 
2013: Table 14.4).
Policies to protect divorcees are important in contexts 
in which families are changing and divorce rates are 
rising. However, they may not be sufficient where 
there is unequal distribution of unpaid care work be-
tween women and men. Foster (2010) points out that 
in the United Kingdom, for instance, children are on 
average 4–5 years old at the time of divorce so caring 
responsibilities are still likely to reduce mothers’ earn-
ings for some years afterwards. These gaps in earning 
history can thus continue to compromise women’s 
pensions even after sharing the pension rights and 
contributions accumulated over marriage (see, for 
example, Ginn 2006; Frericks et al. 2009; Foster 2010).
8.3 
Contribution credits for caregivers
Contribution credits are one way to address the 
adverse impact that time dedicated to taking care 
of others can have on pension entitlements. Most 
European pension systems now offer care-related 
contribution credits (Jefferson 2009: 125; D’Addio 2012) 
and other countries around the world are increasingly 
introducing these provisions as well. The design and 
impacts of contribution credits vary across coun-
tries. In some countries contribution credits increase 
pension amounts irrespective of whether work was 
interrupted or not; in others, contribution credits com-
pensate for the period of time spent out of the labour 
market caring for children; and in still others, credits 
for caring periods count only toward pension qualify-
ing years. Childcare absences can also be implicitly 
considered in the pension system when, for instance, 
the number of years required to obtain a full pension 
are relatively low. In France, a maximum of two years 
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are credited for each child. In Germany’s ‘point system’, 
one point is credited per child, which is equivalent to 
one year of average earnings in the pension formula. 
In Italy, the child credit consists of a more generous 
factor for the calculation of NDC pension benefits 
(D’Addio 2012:79). Additionally, in some countries con-
tribution credits also exist for periods spent caring for 
an adult member of the family.
Contribution credits have also been recently adopted 
in some countries in Latin America. In Uruguay, for 
instance, women are credited with one year of contri-
butions per child (up to a maximum of five) for the 
qualifying conditions of social insurance pensions 
(ISSA 2012a). In Chile, a child credit was introduced in 
2008 to improve the pension benefits of women in 
the private defined contribution system. The credit 
consists of a contribution of 10 per cent on a minimum 
wage for 18 months per child (plus interest), financed 
by the state, which is deposited in women’s individual 
accounts (Arza 2012a). In Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), following pension reform in 2010, mothers can 
also benefit from a contributory credit equivalent to 
one year of contributions per child, up to a maximum 
of three years. Women can use this credit either to get 
better benefits from the solidarity pillar or to antici-
pate retirement (ibid.). 
The effect of contribution credits depends on other 
design features of the pension system as well as on 
the generosity of the credit itself. Some countries 
that do not have contribution credits can achieve 
similar results with other gender equality-enhancing 
elements in pension design, such as short vesting 
periods and progressive benefit formulas. But contri-
bution credits have become particularly important 
after the introduction of defined contribution sys-
tems that strengthen the link between contributions 
and benefits. 
In countries for which estimates exist, contribu-
tion credits for childcare show a positive impact on 
women’s replacement rates. Anna D’Addio estimates 
what would happen if these credits did not exist in 
a number of OECD and EU countries and finds that 
mothers’ replacement rates would decrease by 3 to 7 
percentage points on average with between 3 and 15 
years of career interruption (D’Addio 2012: 90). Positive 
effects, especially for women in the lowest income 
groups, have also been found in estimations for Chile 
(Fajnzylber 2013). Another study, focused on the United 
States, finds that contribution credits and minimum 
benefits favour women in the poorest social strata 
while divorce benefits are mostly oriented to women 
in the highest income groups (Herd 2005). However, 
while contribution credits can be a valuable tool to 
improve women’s pension benefits, they are unlikely 
to close gender gaps in coverage and benefits on their 
own and need to be conceived as part of a wider pack-
age of gender equality-enhancing measures. 
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9. 
CONCLUSION
Gender equality is one of the key challenges confronted by pension systems around the 
world. In a context of gendered labour markets, contributory pension systems face several 
constraints to guarantee universal and adequate pension benefits for women. Women’s lives 
of work are different from men’s in a number of important aspects, and these differences 
affect gender equality in pension entitlements even under gender-neutral pension system 
rules. Women’s lifecourses are characterized by longer periods dedicated to take care of 
others, lower labour market participation, more part-time work and lower earnings. All these 
features compromise their pension entitlements in pension systems that link benefits to paid 
work, contributions and earnings. Although some of these features have been changing over 
the past decades, with more women entering the labour force, gender gaps in the distribution 
of paid and unpaid work in the family are likely to continue to compromise gender equality in 
pension entitlements for the coming generations.
Pension system reforms taking place over the past few 
decades in several countries around the world have had, 
or will have, an impact on gender equality in old age. 
Some reforms can deepen gender gaps by making it 
harder for people without a long and continuous work 
record (most of them women) to get adequate benefits. 
This is the case of benefit cutbacks in public pensions 
as well as of stricter contributory requirements imple-
mented in a context of population aging and fiscal 
austerity in several countries both before and after 
the international financial crisis. In some cases, the 
implementation of individual pension accounts to 
replace pre-existing defined benefit systems has also 
weakened redistribution and reduced the economic 
protection for older adults with limited contribution 
records (i.e., women and informal workers). 
In contrast, policies that have established adequate 
minimum protection floors, extended pension rights 
to previously uncovered groups and made access to 
benefits for non-standard or informal workers more 
flexible can all contribute in one way or another to 
enhancing women’s rights to old age pensions. In par-
ticular, the expansion of non-contributory pensions 
can broaden access to basic economic protection 
for women, especially in middle- and low-income 
countries where most women are not covered by con-
tributory pension systems. However, non-contributory 
pension benefits are usually well below social insur-
ance pension benefit levels and sometimes even too 
low to guarantee an adequate standard of living in 
old age. Hence, the expansion of pension coverage is 
a positive but not sufficient policy to foster adequate 
economic protection of women and gender equality 
in old age. 
Another way to protect older women has been 
through derived benefits. Widow’s pensions remain 
one of the most important policy devices for the 
protection of women lacking a retirement pension of 
their own. However, these arrangements pose distri-
butional dilemmas (transfers from single individuals 
to married couples) and tend to reinforce traditional 
family patterns and gender roles. Other arrangements, 
such as contribution credits that compensate for the 
impact that time dedicated to take care of children or 
elderly members of the family can have on women’s 
pension entitlements, are a positive measure but may 
not overcome all gender gaps in pension benefits on 
their own.
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There is no single or easy solution to overcoming exist-
ing gender gaps in old age protection. Policies need to 
include a package of measures to address inequalities 
from their origins (i.e., reducing gender gaps in the 
labour market, promoting a more equal distribution 
of care work in the family and avoiding gender-blind 
policies) as well as to compensate for gender gaps 
in old age protection when they emerge. Policy re-
sponses thus need to work on several complementary 
fronts, including pension system design, labour mar-
ket regulation and better reconciliation of work and 
family life. This includes providing adequate support 
for families, such as free childcare facilities and regu-
lations on working hours and parental leave. Indeed, 
for many women, lack of access to free childcare may 
mean that only the informal sector offers them work 
opportunities with the flexibility and geographical 
proximity they require to combine paid work and care 
(ILO 2011: 58–59).
Policies also need to consider the heterogeneity of 
women across social strata as well as across coun-
tries. Policies contributing to protect women in 
high-income countries with full formal employment 
may not work well in countries with subsistence 
economies and a high incidence of informal work. By 
the same token, policies that are adequate for high-
income urban women may not be suitable for women 
in lower-income households or in the rural economy. 
Hence policies oriented to improve gender equality 
in old age need to be carefully designed considering 
country-specific features, including labour markets, 
demographic patterns, institutional configuration and 
fiscal space, as well as family structures and women’s 
life-course patterns.
Policies to enhance gender equality and the protec-
tion of women in old age involve making choices 
concerning crucial aspects of pension design. A key 
gender-relevant policy choice regards the link be-
tween contributions and benefits (in other words, 
how tightly work histories should be coupled with 
pension entitlements) and the policy tools available 
to offset gender differences in paid work, earnings 
and unpaid work (such as contribution credits). Other 
crucial choices concern the types of transfers involved 
in derived benefits; the pooling of longevity risks 
across women and men; and the protection of the 
most vulnerable social groups through redistributive 
benefits. All these policy choices naturally involve set-
ting goals and priorities over the distribution of rights 
and resources.
Given all the above, policies oriented to enhance gen-
der equality and the protection of women should not 
be taken as general rules applicable everywhere to the 
benefit of all women. Furthermore, given the inequali-
ties that prevail in the distribution of paid and unpaid 
work and earnings between women and men, pen-
sion systems are unlikely to close all gender gaps on 
their own. They can, however, mitigate or compensate 
for (and also attempt not to exacerbate) existing gen-
der inequalities. With those caveats in mind, gender 
equality-enhancing policy options include:
1. Provide basic protection for all older adults, 
regardless of individual contributory records and 
past paid work and earnings. This involves incorpo-
rating a non-contributory pension as a central pillar 
in the social security system to offer rights-based 
benefits ideally under a universal or pension-tested 
(rather than means-tested) design. Redistribution 
towards the disadvantaged in the labour market can 
also include progressive benefit top-ups for workers 
with limited benefit entitlements, which can benefit 
low-income women and men in particular.
2. Avoid punishing short or interrupted labour mar-
ket histories. Policies for this purpose include making 
vesting periods required for a pension adequate 
for the working patterns of women in each country, 
ensuring that the requirements to access minimum 
pensions allow for the incorporation of most women. 
This also involves designing benefit formulas in a way 
that does not punish time out of work (for instance, 
regarding how career breaks are filled). In defined 
contribution systems, this also relates to ensuring 
that administrative fees in individual accounts do 
not disadvantage workers with low accumulation or 
discontinuous contribution patterns. 
3. Compensate for time dedicated to unpaid work 
and care. This involves providing compensations for 
time dedicated to taking care of children and elderly 
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or sick members of the family. It can also involve mea-
sures to protect pension rights after women are 
divorced or widowed, compensating for the costs that 
the distribution of unpaid work in family arrange-
ments can have on their pension entitlements. 
4. Pool longevity risks broadly. This involves pro-
moting pension schemes that pool longevity risks 
between women and men and avoid punishing those 
who lives longer. It also involves establishing regular 
indexation mechanisms for pension benefits to avoid 
the loss of purchasing power with age, which makes 
women suffer more due to their longevity.
Several policies that are fundamental for the well-
being of women in old age can also be important 
for men. Non-contributory pensions, for instance, 
are as important for informal workers and most low-
income workers in developing countries as they are 
for women. In several cases, giving women a pension 
of their own may be an essential contribution for 
household budgets, benefiting also men within the 
household. Non-contributory pensions provide pre-
dictable and regular transfers that, even if sometimes 
not sufficient to afford a living, can be vital inputs for 
low-income households.
All these policies require decided political action in 
favour of gender equality and redistribution. This is 
not always found in pension reform processes. For 
example, despite important gender impacts, gender 
issues were not on the agenda during the structural 
pension reform process over the 1980s and 1990s 
in Latin America (see, for example, Bertranou 2001; 
Arenas de Mesa and Gana Cornejo 2001; Birgin and 
Pautassi 2001; Pautassi 2002; Bonadona Cossío 2003). 
On the other hand, pension reforms are often not 
easy to make. Even reforms extending rights, which 
are in principle politically rewarding, may generate 
resistance when they touch the benefits received by 
others, impose costs for financing, reassign resources 
or alter previously established social norms. Policy 
makers need to be innovative and seize the right mo-
ment to put relevant issues in the agenda. One key 
constraint in most reforms involving an expansion 
of coverage and benefits is financing, which may 
restrict the options available or generate resistance 
when resources are redirected from other ends (as in 
the case of Renta Dignidad in Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, see Müller 2009). To compensate for gender 
gaps, many gender-equitable policies require state 
subsidies, which are likely to face greater restrictions 
in austerity contexts. Some reforms also require 
administrative capacity – for instance, to administer 
contribution records or means tests –that is not al-
ways present in lower-income countries. 
Across countries and regions, there is substantial space 
for improving pension systems to make them more 
gender equitable. Equality-enhancing pension poli-
cies are now on the agenda in a number of countries 
around the world, and as more countries undertake 
policies to foster gender equality in old age, policy dif-
fusion may also help to promote these across borders. 
There is still a long way to go to achieve adequate pro-
tection for women in most countries, but awareness of 
the inequalities that gender-blind policies can generate 
may be a first important step in that direction.
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